Sunday, May 28, 2017
ObserveIT - Take Action Now. Join our more than 1500 happy customers.
Sunday, February 14, 2016
Real Time warning , blocking and prevention of risky user activity
Many organizations are facing the challenge if educating
their employs on internal policies , policies that are related to IT activity as
:
- Printing
- Sharing and Open Document
- Insert USB
- Copy files to USB
- Visiting sensitive sites
- Start/Stop Windows Services
- Reboot Windows
- And many more…. The list is actually endless
The
way it is done today in most organization is by “orientation session” in which
the new employee learns about the “don’t do".
However, the challenge is that
- Many employees tend to forget policies
- Policies may change
- New policies will need to be conveyed to employees
And when the employee violates a policy, a real time notification
is requited .
ObserveIT User Behavior Analysis (UBA) provides this need by
notifying the user in real time when the user performs a bad action or violates
a policy .
For example, if the user insert USB , his desktop will be blocked
and he will see a windows as below (all messages can be customized). The user
will be also to add comment (excuse) for this activity alert.
If the user open the Active Directory management tool, he will see a window that also direct him to the URL link of the company’s internal policy:
To schedule a demo, please contact me via LinkedIn or
Twitter
Saturday, February 13, 2016
Insider Threat - How to get started
Global and international
risk analysis show that the largest risk in organizations comes from insider
threat and not from external cyber-attacks. In most cases, it’s not a malicious
employee but someone that was manipulated by social engineering techniques by
another college or external person in order to gain insider access. Theft of
intellectual property is an increasing threat to organizations, and can go
unnoticed for months or even years.
Another common insider
theft is when employees taking proprietary information when they believe they
will be, or are, searching for a new job.
Current or former
employees, contractors, or other business partners who have authorized access
to an organization's data pose one of the greatest risks. What is an
insider threat? It's the risk of misuse of access privileges to steal, leak or
destroy customer, company or employee data. So how do you actually detect
questionable actions and access abuse once a user logs in? The large
volume of data generated through normal user activities and lack of visibility into actual user behavior
makes detecting insider based exposures of sensitive data nearly impossible.
Insider Threats represent a major security blind-spot where an increasing number of
today’s security incidents occur.
Addressing Insider
Threat requires that organizations detect abnormal user behavior and educate
their employees about the risks of protecting their accounts being used as a
conduit for others to obtain sensitive data. Most organizations rely on system
logs from applications and devices that typically contain hundreds or thousands
of discrete events in obscure technical language, making it nearly impossible
to determine what a user actually did, let alone proactively determine if their
credentials were hijacked.
With ObserveIT’s user activity monitoring
solution you’ll know when users put your business at risk. The software
can detect and alert on application usage that indicate insider risks becoming
insider threats. ObserveIT screen scrapes all activity and indexes the
textual information on the screen, so you’ll know what’s happening in all
applications, even applications that do not generate logs. You’ll have a clear
picture, literally, of all user actions across your entire enterprise including
web apps, legacy applications, and custom or homegrown applications.
For signs of heightened insider threat you can
setup alerts and generate reports to detect abnormal behavior with how users
are interacting with important data as well as have a visual playback of
exactly what each user did. This provides the early warning system needed to
reduce your risk and strengthen your security posture.
How to get started
For an organization to combat
(Detect, Mitigate, Prevent) insider threats, it needs to establish a
comprehensive and integrated insider threat program that is comprised of
individuals from various departments, business units and supporting functions.
Because each organization is unique, the structure of the insider threat
program may be different. The end result for any insider threat program is the
identification of suspicious or malicious activities and behavioral indicators
by the insider, as these are crucial in limiting or neutralizing the potential
damage that may be caused by an insider threats.
Starting the insider threat
program is a business initiative and will require buy in at the executive level
because it will touch almost every part of the organization, including
security, IT, HR as well as legal and privacy. Building consensus at the
executive level for all of the business units mentioned above will enable those
managing the insider threat program to have the appropriate oversight.
Monday, October 27, 2014
THE RISK THAT SECURITY ADMINISTRATORS ARE EXPOSED TO WHEN IGNORING REAL TIME USER ACTIVITY RECORDING AND BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
Based on
Association of certified fraud Examiners – 2013 Report
Security administrators are exposed to the following Fraud landscape.
The study is based on 94 countries and 1400 cases
The global worldwide actual fraud in 2013 was 3.8 Trillion $ .
Since most frauds today are done via computes , then most
of those frauds could be detected via real time user activity detection
and recording , following by real time user anomalies analysis based on the
user’s attributes as:
Title, department , Location, Age, Gender,
Seniority etc…
Frauds by company type:
· 40% of the frauds that were
analyzed were done in private companies
· 28% public
· 17% governments
By company size
· 31% of frauds in companies with
less than 100 employees
· 20.6% of frauds in companies
with more than 10K employees
Analysis By Sectors
· 16.7% in banks and finance
institutes
· 10.3% in governments and public
Analysis of fraud Types
· 25.1% – corruption
· 26.1% – billing
· 12% - Salaries
Geographic
· USA : 25.1%
· Asia : 51%
By Employee Type:
· Manager : 573K $ in average
incident
· Employee: 60K $ in average
incident
By Departments/divisions:
· Finance:293 cases, 183k$ (avg)
/ case
· Operations: 232 cases , 100k$
(avg) / case
· Legal: 8 cases , 180k$ (avg) /
case
Seniority
· More than 10 years in the
company: 229k$ of average fraud size
· Less than 1 year in the
company: 25k$ of average fraud size
Senior workers are most trusted in the company.
From the seniority analysis we can learn that trust is a
main RISK factor for frauds
Gender:
· 65% - men 200k$/case (take more
risks in life)
Men are more than women in management positions
· 35% - women 91k$/case (more conservative)
Cases by Age:
· 19.6% 41-45
· 3.1% >60
· 5.8% <
26
Fraud size by age
· 600k$ 51-55
· 25k$ <
26
Education
· 75% Academic
· 25% - non Academic
Fraud size by education
· 300k$ Academic
· 75k$ - non Academic
58% of fraud cases done by one person
Fraud size by collaboration:
· One person: 100k$
· Collaboration : 250k$
Which Controls can help you to reduce risk (from most
effective to least):
· Control tools : Real Time User
Activity Monitoring and behaviors analytics
· “Management Review”
reduces the damage by 45.9% (average)
· Hot Line
Bottom line:
· 5% of revenue is lost due of
frauds (3.5T$ in 2013 vs 2.9T$ in 2010)
· Average fraud is 140k$
· 20% of cases over 1 million $
· Discovered by auditors 18
months after the fraud started
Sunday, February 9, 2014
Apache Management
Configure apache to listen on port other than 80
Open httpd.conf file in your text editor. Find this line:
and change it
After change, save it and restart apache.
Open httpd.conf file in your text editor. Find this line:
Listen 80
and change it
Listen 8079
After change, save it and restart apache.
Friday, January 10, 2014
Privileged User Monitoring for SOX Compliance
Many enterprises are facing the SOX compliance challenge of monitoring all of the data activity of their most privileged users. This page highlights several of these challenges and how they can be addressed by a comprehensive database activity auditing solution.
Finally, while database applications like DB2, Oracle, SQL Server, and Sybase rightly
However, privileged users are normally highly valued and trusted individuals who are indispensable to the day-to-day workings of your data environment, and they generally do not respond well to being told by an IT auditor that they are a threat that must be monitored. In reality, with most enterprises working to enforce segregation of duties, most DBAs and System Administrators expect their activity to be monitored and have no issue with this simply because they don’t intend to do anything wrong.
SOX-Mandated Database Activity Monitoring
From a data administrator’s viewpoint, SOX-related monitoring requirements are quite broad, but they can be distilled under five key headings:
In fact, an ideal database activity auditing solution will permit the exact reconstruction of any SQL transaction associated with any of the events stored in its audit trail repository.
Additional Key SOX Activity Auditing Challenges
Database managers, auditors, and security officers bear the burden of satisfying regulatory and internal audit demands for SOX compliance. Numerous trouble spots persist, in addition to privileged user monitoring. Key challenges include:
• Consistent monitoring across all databases –Large enterprises often deploy database products from multiple vendors—DB2, Oracle, SQL Server, Sybase, and so on. Until recently, monitoring access activity across varied databases in a consistent, comprehensive, and normalized way has been effectively impossible. Failed response codes, for example, differ from one product toanother, or even from version to version.
• Inadequate database logs, resulting in non-compliance –Both native logging (database and/or server) and log consolidation tools—ignoring their well-documented performance penalties—invariably fall short of SOX auditing requirements. These solutions yield paradoxical results: both log data overload and defacto non-compliance, the
worst of all worlds.
• Inadequate data management and reporting –SOX compliance includes the demonstrable, repeatable ability to reconstruct event flows by finding and extracting one or more critical events from the current or archived audit trail.
Writing filtering tools for this purpose is very difficult. Furthermore, identifying the key events is just the first of many tasks, which may include storing such events for rapid on-line examination (typically for 60-90 days), generating scheduled reports for auditors and other stakeholders, supporting audit trail search operations, and certifying audit log security.
• Inadequate analytics and alerting –The spirit of SOX adherence also includes identifying and tracking access events that signal potential fraud or other data misuse. For example, it may be necessary to detect and alert on outlier events such as N-time failed logins, large return sets, or statistically rare data access operations. Alerts may
also require integration with other security event management tools. Today’s database tools lack the analytics to support a meaningful alert detection and response system.
• Segregation of duties requirement –A special challenge arises when collecting and maintaining audit trail and report data on privileged users (DBAs, for example)—data that is typically stored on systems managed by these same privileged users. Native database logging and agent-based solutions exhibit this deficiency, which stands in direct violation of both SOX and common sense. The segregation of duties standard dictates that privileged user monitoring data be stored outside the control of the user or users being monitored.
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) IT controls address the integrity of databases that store sensitive financial and business information. In particular, new SOX requirements have shifted the focus from merely understanding who has access to information to continuous monitoring of database activity. These requirements target high risk database activities:
- Privileged user behavior
- Direct access to sensitive data stores
- User privilege escalation
- Failed login
- Failed database operations
- And more
Finally, while database applications like DB2, Oracle, SQL Server, and Sybase rightly
attract most of the attention, the problem invariably extends to other sensitive data stores—file server-resident financial, legal, strategic, and spreadsheet documents being the foremost examples.
SOX Section 404 demands that companies
- evaluate the adequacy of internal controls as they relate to financial reporting
- institute new controls as necessary, and
- perform and reportan assessment of these controls on an annual basis.
In short, Section 404 says, "Management must ensure that appropriate internal controls for financial
reporting are in place."
Furthermore, Section 404 requires not only that corporate and IT officers immediately put in
place internal controls to protect the integrity of financial data (and, by implication, all systems that access that data), but also that the organization must be able to demonstrate that appropriate controls are in place.
At first glance it is quite obvious that the full access credentials accorded to DBAs and system administrators creates a significant vulnerability for an enterprise’s data simply because these privileged users have access to all or a significant fraction of your data.
The problem with this approach is that it is of critical importance for DBAs to have access to database log facilities, so curtailing their privileges effectively curtails their productivity and makes their job more difficult.
This is precisely the challenge that enterprises are facing with the SOX section 404 mandate to monitor the activity, particularly database activity, of their DBAs and other privileged users. The problem arises because it makes no sense to monitor a DBA with full privileges by using the log facilities within the database applications, because their privileges will allow them to cover their tracks by deleting or otherwise altering the logs.
So many enterprises are resorting to curtailing their DBAs’ privileges to prevent them from having any access to the log facilities. The problem with this approach is that DBAs use the database log facilities as a debug tool in order to do their job, so curtailing their privileges effectively curtails their productivity and makes their job more difficult.
Corporate officers, IT auditors, and database administrators find a variety of challenges in the requirement to audit all privileged user activity, which typically ranges over a variety of platforms, applications, and data stores. This page provides detailed analysis of a number of the issues associated with privileged user monitoring.
From a data administrator’s viewpoint, SOX-related monitoring requirements are quite broad, but they can be distilled under five key headings:
Monitoring database access by privileged users—DBAs and system administrators, for example
As the title of this paper implies, privileged user monitoring is the primary objective of most SOX database auditing projects. Additional requirements generally relate to specific activities initiated by privileged users or, potentially, users masquerading as privileged users for malicious purposes.
Enterprises must audit all activity by administrators and other privileged userIDs, and, perhaps more importantly, must be able to retrieve, examine, analyze, and report on this piece of the audit trail.
Enterprises working to comply with this requirement have found that in practice it can be difficult to implement due to a variety of problems:
- The very users they are monitoring typically have full administrator credentials and can cover their tracks by modifying or deleting the logs being used to monitor them.
- Privileged user credentials can be restricted to prevent log access, but this results in lowered productivity or creates an adversarial relationship with unhappy DBAs.
- Many enterprises employ databases from several different database vendors, which require individual expertise on each database’s log capabilities and makes log consolidation into useful reports a near impossibility.
Monitoring changes in privileges
Not all users utilize privileged credentials all the time. Many times users will use privileged credentials on an as needed basis to perform specific tasks. It is imperative to track when these privilege escalation events occur and maintain and regularly view reports of this activity in order to verify the legitimacy of these events.
In order to attest to the integrity of sensitive data, it is imperative to know what is happening in the user community.
Have new users been defined, or an existing user de-provisioned? Have a user’s privileges been escalated or revoked? A complete database activity auditing solution will provide the necessary visibility in to these types of transactions without requiring auditors to search through seemingly endless database log files.
Monitoring access failures
Enterprises must know when login attempts fail, and also when data access attempts are unsuccessful. Failed access events are an indication that something is not right. Application data access attempts, in particular, should never fail.
There are various definitions of invalid logical access attempts. These two are most common:
• unsuccessful attempt to access a resource
• invalid or failed login
An effective database activity monitoring solution must be capable of capturing both classes of failed access operation.
Monitoring schema changes
To ensure data integrity, you must be able to track changes to compliance-related data structures. Monitoring, logging, and reporting on data structure changes not only permits you to satisfy routine auditing requirements, but also to identify anomalous, unscheduled activity.
Monitoring direct data access
Another common requirement is to track any direct access to sensitive system and data tables. Since direct access operations are uncommon in procedural applications, it is important to capture an audit trail of such activities. Alternative tracking techniques, including triggers and local agents, are expensive and do not scale.
Furthermore, a complete database activity auditing solution will capture the necessary detail in the audit trail to not only show that a direct SQL event occurred, but also who initiated the event (what user ID), what source IP address originated the event, and precisely what content was affected by the event (database, tables, columns, and rows).
Additional Key SOX Activity Auditing Challenges
Database managers, auditors, and security officers bear the burden of satisfying regulatory and internal audit demands for SOX compliance. Numerous trouble spots persist, in addition to privileged user monitoring. Key challenges include:
• Consistent monitoring across all databases –Large enterprises often deploy database products from multiple vendors—DB2, Oracle, SQL Server, Sybase, and so on. Until recently, monitoring access activity across varied databases in a consistent, comprehensive, and normalized way has been effectively impossible. Failed response codes, for example, differ from one product toanother, or even from version to version.
• Inadequate database logs, resulting in non-compliance –Both native logging (database and/or server) and log consolidation tools—ignoring their well-documented performance penalties—invariably fall short of SOX auditing requirements. These solutions yield paradoxical results: both log data overload and defacto non-compliance, the
worst of all worlds.
• Inadequate data management and reporting –SOX compliance includes the demonstrable, repeatable ability to reconstruct event flows by finding and extracting one or more critical events from the current or archived audit trail.
Writing filtering tools for this purpose is very difficult. Furthermore, identifying the key events is just the first of many tasks, which may include storing such events for rapid on-line examination (typically for 60-90 days), generating scheduled reports for auditors and other stakeholders, supporting audit trail search operations, and certifying audit log security.
• Inadequate analytics and alerting –The spirit of SOX adherence also includes identifying and tracking access events that signal potential fraud or other data misuse. For example, it may be necessary to detect and alert on outlier events such as N-time failed logins, large return sets, or statistically rare data access operations. Alerts may
also require integration with other security event management tools. Today’s database tools lack the analytics to support a meaningful alert detection and response system.
• Segregation of duties requirement –A special challenge arises when collecting and maintaining audit trail and report data on privileged users (DBAs, for example)—data that is typically stored on systems managed by these same privileged users. Native database logging and agent-based solutions exhibit this deficiency, which stands in direct violation of both SOX and common sense. The segregation of duties standard dictates that privileged user monitoring data be stored outside the control of the user or users being monitored.
PCI Logging and Auditing Compliance for Custom Applications by ObserveIT (www.ObserveIT.com)
Source: http://www.observeit.com/
This is an ongoing requirement that calls for continuous monitoring and review (log review, the key part of Requirement 10.6, is explicitly mandated to occur on a daily basis). Furthermore, according to the Requirement, these records must be immediately available for three months and stored for later retrieval for one year.
There is an easier way.
By simply installing agent software on every machine with direct or indirect access to custom applications, all Requirement 10 compliance needs are instantly met because every user action in every custom application is recorded (in video) and logged (in text logs).
The daily review requirement is neatly met by the User Activity Monitoring system as well: alerts and reports can be created to include any activity involving protected data, making it a simple matter to review a day’s worth of relevant access to the data. Predefined compliance reports supplied with these systems can show all relevant actions, with links to video replay for further clarification, allowing almost out-of-the-box compliance.
In conclusion, the demands of PCI-DSS Requirement 10, which have been intimidating IT teams and management teams alike, are easily met with a suitable User Activity Monitoring system – even for custom applications for which no built-in logging exists. Auditors appreciate the user friendliness of these systems which combine instant keyword search with visual recordings of every user action. Daily log reviews are fast and easy with predefined compliance reports.
PCI-DSS Requirement 10: Logging and Auditing
PCI-DSS Requirement 10 (“Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data”) is all about using logs for vulnerability management and event forensics. These logs must record every time someone accesses regulated data (including cardholder data and log data) to enable a “who-did-what-and-when” audit trail. This requires means implementing a comprehensive system to log every time any employee or remote vendor accesses a server or application which processes protected data.This is an ongoing requirement that calls for continuous monitoring and review (log review, the key part of Requirement 10.6, is explicitly mandated to occur on a daily basis). Furthermore, according to the Requirement, these records must be immediately available for three months and stored for later retrieval for one year.
The Challenge of PCI-DSS Requirement 10 for Custom Applications
Complying with this requirement may be very difficult for custom applications that don’t already incorporate comprehensive logging. Even if the application source code is available – and relevant developers are on hand – implementing the mandated logging into these applications may require an extremely difficult, expensive and risky undertaking.There is an easier way.
An Elegant PCI Logging Solution for Custom Applications
Achieving PCI logging and auditing compliance for custom applications no longer requires touching a line of custom code. Instead, software known as Screen Session Recording or User Activity Monitoring can help you satisfy compliance requirements by monitoring and recording every user action performed within custom applications – just like a video camera watching all users’ screen activity from over their shoulder. Furthermore, these systems generate text-searchable logs which are linked to the screen recordings.By simply installing agent software on every machine with direct or indirect access to custom applications, all Requirement 10 compliance needs are instantly met because every user action in every custom application is recorded (in video) and logged (in text logs).
The daily review requirement is neatly met by the User Activity Monitoring system as well: alerts and reports can be created to include any activity involving protected data, making it a simple matter to review a day’s worth of relevant access to the data. Predefined compliance reports supplied with these systems can show all relevant actions, with links to video replay for further clarification, allowing almost out-of-the-box compliance.
In conclusion, the demands of PCI-DSS Requirement 10, which have been intimidating IT teams and management teams alike, are easily met with a suitable User Activity Monitoring system – even for custom applications for which no built-in logging exists. Auditors appreciate the user friendliness of these systems which combine instant keyword search with visual recordings of every user action. Daily log reviews are fast and easy with predefined compliance reports.
Thursday, January 2, 2014
PCI DSS Requirement Section 12: Maintain an Information Security Policy
A
strong security policy sets the tone for security affecting an organization’s entire company, and it
informs
employees of their expected duties related to security. All employees should be
aware of the
sensitivity
of cardholder data and their responsibilities for protecting it.
Requirement
12: Maintain a policy that addresses information security for all personnel
12.1 Establish, publish, maintain, and disseminate a security
policy that addresses all PCI DSS
requirements,
includes an annual process for identifying vulnerabilities and formally
assessing
risks,
and includes a review at least once a year and when the environment changes.
12.2 Develop daily operational security procedures that are
consistent with requirements in PCI DSS.
12.3 Develop usage policies for critical technologies to define
their proper use by all personnel. These
include
remote access, wireless, removable electronic media, laptops, tablets, handheld
devices,
email
and Internet.
12.4 Ensure that the security policy and procedures clearly define
information security responsibilities
for
all personnel.
12.5 Assign to an individual or team information security
responsibilities defined by 12.5 subsections.
12.6 Implement a formal security awareness program to make all
personnel aware of the importance of
cardholder
data security.
12.7 Screen potential personnel prior to hire to minimize the risk
of attacks from internal sources.
Example
screening includes previous employment history, criminal record, credit
history, and
reference
checks.
providers’ PCI DSS compliance status at least annually.
12.9
Implement an incident response plan. Be
prepared to respond immediately to a system breach.
12.8 If cardholder data is shared with service providers, maintain
policies and procedures to formally
identify
service provider responsibilities for securing cardholder data, and monitor
serviceproviders’ PCI DSS compliance status at least annually.
PCI DSS Requirement (Section 10): Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data
10. Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data
10.1 Establish a process for linking all access to system
components (especially access done with administrative privileges such as
root) to each individual user.
|
10.2 Implement automated audit trails to reconstruct the
following events:
all individual user accesses to
cardholder data, all actions taken by any individual with root or
administrative privileges, access to all audit trails, invalid logical access
attempts, use of identification and authentication mechanisms, initialization
of the audit logs, and creation and deletion of system-level objects.
|
10.3 Record at least the following audit trail entries for all
system components for each event: user identification, type of event, date
and time, success or failure indication, origination of event, and identity
or name of affected data, system component, or resource.
|
10.4 Synchronize all critical system clocks and times.
|
10.5 Secure audit trails so they cannot be altered.
|
10.6 Review logs for all system components at least daily. Log
reviews must include those servers that perform security functions like
intrusion detection system (IDS) and authentication, authorization, and
accounting protocol (AAA) servers (for example, RADIUS).
|
10.7 Retain audit trail for at least one year, with a minimum
of three months available online.
|
PCI DSS Requirement (Section 8): User & Password Policy
8.1 Assign all users a unique ID before allowing them to access system components
or cardholder data.
8.2 In addition to assigning a unique ID, employ at least one of the following methods
to authenticate all users:
- Password or passphrase
- Two-factor authentication (for example, token devices, smart cards,
biometrics, or public keys)
8.3 Incorporate two-factor authentication for remote access (network-level access
originating from outside the network) to the network by employees, administrators,
and third parties. Use technologies such as remote authentication and dial-in
service (RADIUS); terminal access controller access control system (TACACS)
with tokens; or VPN (based on SSL/TLS or IPSEC) with individual certificates.
8.4 Render all passwords unreadable during transmission and storage on all system
components using strong cryptography
8.5 Ensure proper user authentication and password management for non-consumer
users and administrators on all system components as follows:
8.5.1Control addition, deletion, and modification of user IDs, credentials, and
other identifier objects.
8.5.2Verify user identity before performing password resets.
8.5.3Set first-time passwords to a unique value for each user and change
immediately after the first use.
8.5.4Immediately revoke access for any terminated users.
8.5.5Remove/disable inactive user accounts at least every 90 days.
8.5.6Enable accounts used by vendors for remote maintenance only during the
time period needed.
8.5.7Communicate password procedures and policies to all users who have
access to cardholder data. Add-on Add-on
8.5.8Do not use group, shared, or generic accounts and passwords.
8.5.9Change user passwords at least every 90 days.
8.5.10Require a minimum password length of at least seven characters.
8.5.11Use passwords containing both numeric and alphabetic characters.
8.5.12Do not allow an individual to submit a new password that is the same as
any of the last four passwords he or she has used.
8.5.13Limit repeated access attempts by locking out the user ID after not more
than six attempts.
8.5.14Set the lockout duration to a minimum of 30 minutes or until administrator
enables the user ID.
8.5.15If a session has been idle for more than 15 minutes, require the user to reenter
the password to re-activate the terminal.
8.5.16Authenticate all access to any database containing cardholder data. This
includes access by applications, administrators, and all other users.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)

